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ABSTRACT
Firms  can  finance  themselves  on-  or  off-balance  sheet.  Off-balance  sheet  financing  involves
transferring assets to "special purpose vehicles" (SPVs), following accounting and regulatory rules
that circumscribe relations between the sponsoring firm and the SPVs. SPVs are carefully designed
to avoid bankruptcy. If the firm's bankruptcy costs are high, off-balance sheet financing can be
advantageous, especially for sponsoring firms that are risky. In a repeated SPV game, firms can
"commit" to subsidize or "bail out" their SPVs when the SPV would otherwise not honor its debt
commitments. Investors in SPVs know that, despite legal and accounting restrictions to the contrary,
SPV sponsors can bail out their SPVs if there is the need. We find evidence consistent with these


















I.    Introduction 
 
The use of special purposes vehicles (SPVs) in corporate finance seems to be pervasive.
1  What is 
the source of value to organizing corporate activity using SPVs?  In this paper we argue that 
SPVs exist to avoid bankruptcy costs. 
 
By financing the firm in pieces, some on-balance sheet and some off-balance sheet, control rights 
to the business decisions are separated from the financing decisions.  The SPV sponsoring firm 
maintains control over the business decisions while the financing is done in SPVs that are 
passive; they cannot make business decisions. Furthermore, the SPVs are not subject to 
bankruptcy costs because they cannot go bankrupt, as a matter of design.  Bankruptcy is a process 
of transferring control rights over corporate assets.  Securitization reduces the amount of assets 
that are subject to this expensive and lengthy process.  We argue that the existence of SPVs 
depends on implicit contractual arrangements that avoid accounting and regulatory impediments 
to reducing bankruptcy costs.  We develop a model of off-balance sheet financing and test the 
implications of the model. 
 
An SPV, or a special purpose entity (SPE), is a legal entity created by a firm (known as the 
sponsor or originator) by transferring assets to the SPV, to carry out some specific purpose, or 
circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions.  SPVs have no purpose other than the 
transaction(s) for which they were created, and they can make no substantive decisions; the rules 
governing them are set down in advance and carefully circumscribe their activities.  Indeed, no 
one works at an SPV and it has no physical location. 
 
The legal form for an SPV may be a limited partnership, a limited liability company, a trust, or a 
corporation.
2  Typically, off-balance sheet SPVs have the following characteristics: 
 
  They are thinly capitalized; 
  They have no independent management or employees; 
                                                 
1 Below we present the evidence on use of special purpose vehicles in the cases where such data exist.  As 
explained below, these are “qualified” special purpose vehicles.  Data on other types of SPVs are not 
systematically collected. 
 
2 There are also a number of vehicles that owe their existence to special legislation.  These include 
REMICs, FASITs, RICs, and REITs.  In particular, their tax status is subject to specific tax code 




  Their administrative functions are performed by a trustee who follows prespecified 
rules with regard to the receipt and distribution of cash; there are no other decisions; 
  Assets held by the SPV are serviced via a servicing arrangement; 
  They are structured so that they cannot become bankrupt, as a practical matter. 
 
In short, SPVs are essentially robot firms that have no employees, make no substantive economic 
decisions, have no physical location, and cannot go bankrupt.  Off-balance sheet financing 
arrangements can take the form of research and development limited partnerships, leasing 
transactions, or asset securitizations, to name the most prominent.
3  And less visible are tax 
arbitrage-related transactions.  In this paper we address the question of why SPVs exist. 
 
The existence of SPVs raises important issues for the theory of the firm: What is a firm and what 
are its boundaries? Does a “firm” include the SPVs sponsored by the firm? (From an accounting 
or tax point of view, this is the issue of consolidation.)  What is the relationship between a 
sponsoring firm and its SPV?  In what sense does the sponsor “control” the SPV?  Are investors 
indifferent between investing in SPV securities and the sponsor’s securities?  To make headway 
on these questions we first theoretically investigate the question of the existence of SPVs.  Then 
we test some implications of the theory using unique data on credit card securitizations. 
 
One argument for why SPVs are used is that sponsors may benefit from a lower cost of capital 
because sponsors can remove debt from the balance sheet, so balance sheet leverage is reduced.  
Enron, which created over 3,000 off-balance sheet SPVs, is the leading example of this (see Klee 
and Butler (2002)).  But Enron was able to (apparently fraudulently) keep their off-balance sheet 
debt from being observed by investors, and so obtained a lower cost of capital.  If market 
participants are aware of the off-balance sheet vehicles, and assuming that the off-balance sheet 
vehicles truly satisfy the legal and accounting requirements to be off-balance sheet, then it is not 
immediately obvious how this lowers the cost of capital for the sponsor.  In the context of 
operating leases Lim, Mann, and Mihov (2003) find that bond yields reflect off-balance sheet 
debt.
4  
                                                 
3 On research and development limited partnerships see, e.g., Shevlin (1987) and Beatty, Berger, and 
Magliolo (1995); on leasing see, e.g., Hodge (1996, 1998), and Weidner (2000).  Securitization is discussed 
in detail below. 
 
4 There are other accounting motivations for setting up off-balance sheet SPVs.  Shakespeare (2001, 2003) 
argues, in the context of securitization, that managers use the gains from securitization to meet earnings 




The key issue concerns why otherwise equivalent debt issued by the SPV is priced or valued 
differently than on-balance sheet debt by investors.  The difference between on- and off-balance 
sheet debt turns on the question of what is meant by the phrase used above “truly satisfy the 
…requirements to be off-balance sheet.”  In this paper we argue that “off-balance sheet” is not a 
completely accurate description of what is going on.  The difficultly lies in the distinction 
between formal contracts (which subject to accounting and regulatory rules) and “relational” or 
“implicit” contracts.  Relational contracts are arrangements that circumvent the difficulties of 




While there are formal requirements, reviewed below, for determining the relationships between 
sponsors and their SPVs, including when the SPVs are not consolidated and when the SPVs’ 
debts are off-balance sheet, this is not the whole story. There are other, implicit, contractual 
relations.  The relational contract we focus on concerns sponsors’ support of their SPVs in certain 
states of the world, and investors’ reliance on this support even though sponsors are not legally 
bound to support their SPVs – and in fact under accounting and regulatory rules are not supposed 
to provide support. 
 
The possibility of this implicit support, “implicit recourse,” or “moral recourse” has been noted 
by regulators, rating agencies, and academic researchers.  U.S. bank regulators define “implicit 
recourse” or “moral recourse” as the “provision of credit support, beyond contractual 
obligations...” See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency  (OCC), et. al (2002, p. 1).  The 
OCC goes on to offer guidance on how bank examiners are to detect this problem.  An example 
of the rating agency view is that of FitchIBCA (1999):  “Although not legally required, issuers 
[sponsors] may feel compelled to support a securitization and absorb credit risk beyond the 
residual exposure.  In effect, there is moral recourse since failure to support the securitization 
may impair future access to the capital markets” (p. 4).   Gorton and Pennacchi (1989, 1995) first 
                                                                                                                                                 
sale” is booked.  Calomiris and Mason (2004) consider regulatory capital arbitrage as a motivation for 
securitization, but conclude in favor of the “efficient contracting view,” by which they mean that “banks 
use securitization with recourse to permit them to set capital relative to risk in a manner consistent with 
market, rather than regulatory, capital requirements and to permit them to overcome problems of 
asymmetric information… “(p. 26).  
 
5 On relational contracts in the context of the theory of the firm see Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) 




discussed the issue of implicit recourse in financial markets in the context of the bank loan sales 
market; they also provide some empirical evidence for its existence. 
  
Nonetheless, there are many unanswered questions.  Why are SPVs valuable? Are they valuable 
to all firms?  Why do sponsors offer recourse?  How is the implicit arrangement self-enforcing?  
The details of how the arrangement works and, in particular, how it is a source of value has never 
been explained.  We show that the value of the relational contract, in terms of cost of capital for 
the sponsor, is related to the details of the legal and accounting structure, which we explain 
below.  To briefly foreshadow the arguments to come, the key point is that SPVs cannot go 
bankrupt. In the U.S. it is not possible to waive the right to have access to the government’s 
bankruptcy procedure, but it is possible to structure an SPV so that there cannot be “an event of 
default” which would throw the SPV into bankruptcy.  This means that debt issued by the SPV 
should not include a premium reflecting expected bankruptcy costs, as there never will be any 
such costs.
6  So, one benefit to sponsors is that the off-balance sheet debt should be cheaper, 
ceteris paribus.  However, there are potential costs to off-balance sheet debt.  One is the fixed cost 
of setting up the SPV.  Another is that there is no tax advantage of off-balance sheet debt to the 
SPV sponsor.  Depending on the structure of the SPV, the interest expense of off-balance sheet 
debt may not be tax deductible. 
 
After reviewing the institutional detail, which is particularly important for this subject, we then 
develop these ideas in the context of a simple model.  The model analysis unfolds in steps.  First, 
we determine a benchmark corresponding to the value of the stand-alone entity, which issues debt 
to investors in the capital markets.  For concreteness we refer to this firm as a bank.  The bank 
makes an effort choice to create assets of types that are unobservable to the outside investors.  
Step two considers the situation where the assets can be allocated between on- and off-balance 
sheet financing, but the allocation of the assets occurs before the quality of individual assets has 
been determined.  From the point of view of investors in the SPV’s debt, there is a moral hazard 
problem in that the bank may not make an effort to create high value assets.  The sponsoring 
bank’s decision problem depends on bankruptcy costs, taxes, and other considerations.  We 
provide conditions under which it is optimal for the sponsoring bank to use an SPV. 
 
                                                 
6 However, as we discuss below, the debt may be repaid early due to early amortization.  This is a kind of 
prepayment risk from the point of view of the investors.  
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The third step allows the bank to allocate assets after it has determined the qualities of its 
individual assets. In other words, investors in the debt issued by the SPV face an additional 
problem.  In addition to the moral hazard associated with the effort choice, there is an adverse 
selection problem with regard to which projects are allocated to the SPV.  We call this problem 
the “strategic adverse selection problem.”  In this case, investors will not buy the debt of the SPV 
because they cannot overcome the strategic adverse selection problem.  However, we show that if 
the sponsor can commit to subsidize the SPV in states of the world where the SPV’s assets are 
low quality and the sponsor’s on-balance sheet assets are high quality, then the SPV is viable.  In 
particular, if the bank can commit to subsidize the SPV in certain states of the world, then the 
profitability of the bank is the same as it would be when projects were allocated between the bank 
and the SPV prior to their realizations, i.e., when there was no strategic adverse selection. 
 
But, how does the commitment happen?  Sponsors cannot verifiably commit to state-contingent 
subsidies.  Even if they could verifiably commit to such strategies, legal considerations would 
make this undesirable; as the courts view such recourse as meaning that the assets were never 
sold to the SPV in the first place.  In this case, the SPV is not bankruptcy remote.  As Klee and 
Butler (2002) write: 
 
The presence of recourse is the most important aspect of risk allocation because it suggests 
that the parties intended a loan and not a sale.  If the parties had intended a sale, then the 
buyer would have retained the risk of default, not the seller.  The greater the recourse the 
SPV has against the Originator, through for example chargebacks or adjustments to the 
purchase price, the more the transfer resembles a disguised loan rather than a sale.  Courts 
differ on the weight they attach to the presence of recourse provisions.  Some courts view the 
presence of such a provision as nearly conclusive of the parties’ intent to create a security 
interest, while others view recourse as only one of a number of factors.  (p. 52). 
 
This means that, as a practical matter, the recourse must not be explicit, cannot be formalized, and 
must be subtle and rare. 
 
The final step in the analysis is to show that in a repeated context it is possible to implement a 
form of commitment.  This result is based on the familiar use of trigger strategies (e.g. Friedman 
(1971), and Green and Porter (1984)), which create an incentive for the sponsor to follow the 
implicit arrangement.  Previous applications of such strategies involve settings of oligopolistic 
competition, where firms want to collude but cannot observe strategic price or quantity choices of 
rivals.  Intertemporal incentives to collude are maintained via punishment periods triggered by 
deviations from the implicit collusive arrangements. Our application is quite different.  Here  
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firms sponsoring SPVs “collude” with the investors in the SPVs by agreeing to the state 
contingent subsidization of the SPV – recourse that is prohibited by accounting and regulatory 
rules.  In this sense SPVs are a kind of “regulatory arbitrage.” 
 
Two empirically testable implications follow from the theoretical analysis.  First, because the 
value in using SPVs derives in large part from avoiding bankruptcy costs, riskier firms should be 
the ones that engage in off-balance sheet financing.  Mills and Newberry (2004) find that riskier 
firms use more off-balance sheet debt.  Also, see Moody’s (1997).   We first test this proposition. 
 
Second, following Gorton and Pennacchi (1989, 1995), implicit recourse implies that investors in 
the debt of the SPV incorporate expectations about the risk of the sponsor.  This is because the 
sponsor must exist in order to subsidize the SPV in some states of the world.  As Moody’s (1997) 
puts it: “Part of the reason for the favorable pricing of the [SPVs’] securities is the perception on 
the part of many investors that originators (i.e., the ‘sponsors’ of the securitizations) will 
voluntarily support – beyond that for which they are contractually obligated – transactions in 
which asset performance deteriorates significantly in the future.  Many originators have, in fact, 
taken such actions in the past” (p. 40). We also test this proposition. 
 
The empirical work focuses on credit card securitizations.  Securitization was chosen because of 
data availability.  Credit cards, in particular, are an interesting asset class because it involves 
revolving credits that are repeatedly sold into SPVs.  Moreover, it is the largest category within 
non-mortgage securitizations. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II we provide some background information on off-
balance sheet vehicles generally.  Then, in Section III we focus more narrowly on some of the 
details on how securitization vehicles work specifically.  Section IV presents and analyzes a 
model of off-balance sheet financing.  In Section V we explain and review the data sets used in 
the empirical work.  The first hypothesis, concerning the existence of implicit recourse, is tested 
in Section VI.  The second hypothesis, that riskier firms securitize more, is tested in Section VII.  







II.  Background on SPVs 
 
In this section we briefly review some of the important institutional background for 
understanding SPVs and their relation to their sponsor. 
 
A.  Legal Form of the SPV 
 
A special purpose vehicle or special purpose entity is a legal entity which has been set up for a 
specific, limited, purpose by another entity, the sponsoring firm.  An SPV can take the form of a 
corporation, trust, partnership, or a limited liability company.  The SPV may be a subsidiary of 
the sponsoring firm, or it may be an “orphan” SPV, one that is not consolidated with the 




Most commonly in securitization, the SPV takes the legal form of a trust.  Traditionally, a trust is 
“a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of an 
intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property [the 
trustee] to duties with it for the benefit of” third party beneficiaries (Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts).  Often the SPV is a charitable or purpose trust.  Traditional gratuitous or charitable trusts 
have been transformed into a vehicle with a different economic substance than perhaps 
contemplated by the law.  These trusts, commercial trusts, are very different from gratuitous 
trusts (see Schwarcz (2003b), Langbein (1997), and Sitkoff (2003)).   
 
A purpose trust (called a STAR trust in the Cayman Islands) is a trust set up to fulfill specific 
purposes rather than for beneficiaries.  A charitable trust has charities as the beneficiaries.  For 
many transactions there are benefits if the SPV is domiciled offshore, usually in Bermuda, the 
Cayman Islands, or the British Virgin Islands. 
 
B.  Accounting 
 
                                                 
7 Interesting and important issues arise when the SPV and the sponsor are in different countries legally.  
This is often the case as the SPV is legally usually in a tax haven such as the Cayman Islands.  Below we 




A key question for an SPV (from the point of view of SPV sponsors, if not economists) is 
whether the SPV is off-balance sheet or not with respect to some other entity.  This is an 
accounting issue, which turns on the question of whether the transfer of receivables from the 
sponsor to the SPV is treated as a sale or a loan for accounting purposes.
8  The requirements for 
the transfer to be treated as a sale, and hence receive off-balance sheet treatment, are set out in 
Financial Accounting Standard No. 140 (FAS 140), “Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of 
Financial Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities,” promulgated in September 2000.
9  FAS 140 
essentially has two broad requirements for a “true sale.”  First, the SPV must be a “qualifying 
SPV” and second the sponsor must surrender control of the receivables. 
 
In response to Enron’s demise, the Federal Accounting Standard Board (FASB) adopted FASB 
Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46) (revised December 2003), “Consolidation of Variable Interest 
Entities, an Interpretation of Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 51, which has the aim of 
improving financial reporting and disclosure by companies with variable interest entities 
(VIEs).
10  Basically, FASB’s view is that the then current accounting rules that determined 
whether an SPV should be consolidated were inadequate.  Because FASB had difficulty defining 
an SPV, it created the VIE concept.  FIN 46 sets forth a new measure of financial control, one not 
based on majority of voting interests, but based on who holds the majority of the residual risk and 
obtains the majority of the benefits, or both – independent of voting power. 
 
A “qualifying” SPV (QSPV) is an SPV that meets the requirements set forth in FAS 140, 
otherwise it is treated as a VIE in accordance with FIN 46.  FIN 46 does not apply to QSPVs. To 
be a qualifying SPV means that the vehicle: (1) is “demonstrably distinct” from the sponsor; (2) is 
significantly limited in its permitted activities, and these activities are entirely specified by the 
legal documents defining its existence; (3) holds only “passive” receivables, that is there are no 
decisions to be made; (4) has the right, if any, to sell or otherwise dispose of non-cash receivables 
only in “automatic response” to the occurrence of certain events.  The term, “demonstrably 
distinct,” means that the sponsor cannot have the ability to unilaterally dissolve the SPV, and that 
                                                 
8 If the conditions of a sale are met, then the transferor must recognize a gain or loss on the sale. 
 
9 Prior to FAS 140 the issue was addressed by FAS 125.  FAS 140 was intended to clarify several 
outstanding question left ambiguous in FAS 125. 
 
10 VIEs are defined by FASB to be entities that do not have sufficient equity to finance their activities 
without additional subordinated support.  It also includes entities where the equity holders do not have 
voting or other rights to make decisions about the entity, are not effectively residual claimants, and do not 
have the right to expected residual returns.    
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at least ten percent of the fair value (of its beneficial interests) must be held by unrelated third 
parties. 
 
On the second requirement of FAS 140, the important aspect of “surrendering control” is that the 
sponsor can not retain effective control over the transferred assets through an ability to 
unilaterally cause the SPV to return specific assets (other than through a cleanup call or to some 
extent ‘removal of accounts provisions’).  
 
FAS 140 states that the sponsor need not include the debt of a qualifying SPV-subsidiary in the 
sponsor’s consolidated financial statements. 
 
A QSPV must be a separate and distinct legal entity, separate and distinct, that is, from the 
sponsor (the sponsor does not consolidate the SPV for accounting reasons). It must be an 
automaton in the sense that there are no substantive decisions for it to ever make, simply rules 
that must be followed; it must be bankruptcy remote, meaning that the bankruptcy of the sponsor 
has no implications for the SPV; and the SPV itself must (as a practical matter) never be able to 
become bankrupt. 
 
C.  Bankruptcy 
 
An essential feature of an SPV is that it be “bankruptcy remote,” that is, that the SPV never be 
able to become legally bankrupt.  The most straightforward way to achieve this would be for the 
SPV to waive its right to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, but this is legally unenforceable 
(see Klee and Butler (2002), p. 33 ff.).  The only way to completely eliminate the risk of either 
voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy is to create the SPV in a legal form that is ineligible to be a 
debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  The SPV can be structured to achieve this result.  As 
described by Klee and Butler (2002): “The use of SPVs is simply a disguised form of bankruptcy 
waiver” (p. 34).   
 
To make the SPV as bankruptcy remote as possible, its activities can be restricted, for instance it 
can be restricted from issuing debt beyond a stated limit. Standard and Poor’s (2002) lists the 
following traditional characteristics for a bankruptcy remote SPV: 
 
•  Restrictions on objects, powers, and purposes;  
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•  Limitations on ability to incur indebtedness; 
•  Restrictions or prohibitions on merger, consolidation, dissolution, liquidation, 
winding up, asset sales, transfers of equity interests, and amendments to the 
organizational documents relating to “separateness”;  
•  Incorporation of separateness covenants restricting dealings with parents and 
affiliates; 
•  “Non-petition” language (i.e., a covenant not to file the SPE into involuntary 
bankruptcy); 
•  Security interests over assets; and 
•  An independent director (or functional equivalent) whose consent is required for the 
filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition. 
 
The SPV can also obtain agreements from its creditors that they will not file involuntary petitions 
for bankruptcy.  Depending on the legal form of the SPV, it may require more structure to insure 
effective bankruptcy remoteness.  For example, if the SPV is a corporation, where the power to 
file a voluntary bankruptcy petition lies with the board of directors, then the charter or by-laws 
can be structured to require unanimity.  Sometimes charters or by-laws have provisions that 
negate the board’s discretion unless certain other criteria are met. 
 
An involuntary bankruptcy occurs under certain circumstances (see Section 303(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code).  Chief among the criteria is non payment of debts as they become due.   
Perhaps most important for securitization vehicles, shortfalls of cash leading to an inability to 
make promised coupon payments can lead to early amortization rather than an event of default on 
the debt.  This is discussed further below. 
 
There is also the risk that if the sponsor of the SPV goes bankrupt that the bankruptcy judge will 
recharacterize the “true sale” of assets to the SPV as a secured financing, which would bring the 
assets back onto the bankrupt sponsor’s balance sheet.  Or the court may consolidate the assets of 
the sponsor and the SPV. As a result of this risk, must structured financings have a two-tiered 
structure involving two SPVs.  Often times the sponsor retains a residual interest in the SPV that 
provides a form of credit enhancement, but the residual interest may preclude a “true sale.”   
Consequently, the residual interest is held by another SPV, not the sponsor.  The “true sale” 
occurs with respect to this second vehicle.  This is shown in Figure 1, which is taken from 







There are two tax issues.  First, how is the SPV taxed?  Second, what are the tax implications of 
the SPV’s debt for the sponsoring firm?  We briefly summarize the answers to these questions. 
 
The first question is easier to answer.  SPVs are usually structured so as to be tax neutral, that is, 
so that their profits are not taxed.  The failure to achieve tax neutrality would usually result in 
taxes being imposed once on the income of the sponsor and once again on the distributions from 
the SPV.  This “double tax” would most likely make SPVs unprofitable for the sponsor.  There 
are a number of ways to design the SPV to achieve tax neutrality.  We briefly review some of 
them. 
 
Many SPVs are incorporated in a tax haven jurisdiction, such as the Cayman Islands, where they 
are treated as “exempted companies.”  See Ashman (2000).  An exempted company is not 
permitted to conduct business in, for example, the Cayman Islands, and in return is awarded a 
total tax holiday for twenty years, with the possibility of a ten year extension.  Because such 
entities are not organized or created in the U.S., they are not subject to U.S. federal income tax, 
except to the extent that their income arises from doing business in the U.S.  However, the 
organizational documents for the SPV will limit it so that for purposes of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, it can be construed as not being “engaged in U.S. trade or business.”  
 
An investment trust that issues pass-through certificates is tax neutral, that is, the trust is ignored 
for tax purposes – there is no taxation at the trust level – and the certificate owners are subject to 
tax.  Pass-through certificates represent pro rata interests in the underlying pool.  It is important 
for maintaining this tax neutral tax status that the SPV not be reclassified as a corporation.  To 
avoid this it is necessary that the trustee have no power to vary the investments in the asset pool 
ands activities must be limited to conserving and protecting the assets for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries of the trust.  See Kramer (2003). 
 
More common than pass-through structures are pay-through structures.  Pay-through bonds are 
issued by SPVs that are corporations or owner trusts.  In these structures the SPVs issue bonds, 
                                                 
11 This subsection is based on Kramer (2003), Peaslee and Nirenberg (2001), and Humphreys and 
Kreistman (1995).  
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but this requires that there be a party that holds the residual risk, an equity holder.  If the SPV is a 
corporation, then the pay-through bonds have minimal tax at the corporate level because the 
SPV’s taxable income or loss is the difference between the yields on its assets and the coupons on 
its pay-through bonds.  Typically these are matched as closely as possible. 
 
The second question is more complicated.  Some SPVs achieve off-balance sheet status for 
accounting purposes but not for tax purposes.  Securitizations can fit into this category because 
they can be treated as secured financing for tax purposes. 
 
E.  Credit Enhancement 
 
Because the SPV’s business activities are constrained and its ability to incur debt is limited, it 
faces the risk of a shortfall of cash below what it is obligated to pay investors.  This chance is 
minimized via credit enhancement.  The most important form of credit enhancement occurs via 
tranching of the risk of loss due to default of the underlying borrowers.  Tranching takes the form 
of a capital structure for the SPV, with some senior rated tranches sold to investors in the capital 
markets (called the A notes and the B notes), a junior security (called a C note) which is typically 
privately placed, and various forms of equity-like claims.  Credit enhancement takes a variety of 
other forms as well, including over-collateralization, securities backed by a letter of credit, or a 
surety bond, or a tranche may be guaranteed by a monoline insurance company.  There may also 
be internal reserve funds that build-up and diminish based on various criteria.  We review this is 
more detail below with respect to credit card securitization in particular.  
 
F.  The Use of Off-Balance Sheet Financing 
 
Off-balance sheet financing is, by definition, excluded from the sponsor’s financial statement 
balance sheet, and so it is not reported systematically.  Consequently, it is hard to say how 
extensive the use of SPVs has become.  Qualified off-balance sheet SPVs that are used for asset 
securitization usually issue publicly rated debt and so there is more information about these 
vehicles.  That data is presented and discussed below.  SPVs that are not qualified, however, are 
hidden, as was revealed by the demise of Enron.  Enron led to assertions that the use of off-
balance sheet SPVs is extreme.
12  But, in fact, the extent of the use of SPVs is unknown. 
                                                 
12 For example, Henry, et al. (2002):  “Hundreds of respected U.S. companies are ferreting away trillions 
of dollars in debt in off-balance sheet subsidiaries, partnerships, and assorted obligations.”  
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III.  Securitization 
 
Securitization is one of the more visible forms of the use of off-balance sheet SPVs because 
securitization uses qualified SPVs and involves selling registered, rated, securities in the capital 
markets.  Consequently, there is data available.  Our empirical work will concentrate on credit 
card receivables securitization.  In this section we briefly review the important features of 
securitization SPVs. 
 
A.  Overview of Securitization 
 
Securitization involves the following steps:  (i) a sponsor or originator of receivables sets up the 
bankruptcy remote SPV, pools the receivables, and transfers them to the SPV as a “true sale”; (ii) 
the cash flows  are tranched into asset-backed securities, the most senior of which are rated and 
issued in the market; the proceeds are used to purchase the receivables from the sponsor; (iii) the 
pool revolves in that over a period of time the principal received on the underlying receivables is 
used to purchase new receivables; (iv) there is a final amortization period, during which all 
payments received from the receivables are used to pay down tranche principal amounts.  Credit 
card receivables are different from other pools of underlying loans because the underlying loan to 
the consumer is a revolving credit; it has no natural maturity, unlike an automobile loan, for 
example.  Consequently, the maturity of the SPV debt is determined arbitrarily by stating that 
receivable payments after a certain date are “principal” payments. 
 
Figure 2 shows a schematic drawing of a typical securitization transaction.  The diagram shows 
the two key steps in the securitization process: pooling and tranching.  Pooling and tranching 
correspond to different types of risk.  Pooling minimizes the potential adverse selection problem 
associated with the selection of the assets to be sold to the SPV.  Conditional on selection of the 
assets, tranching divides the risk of loss due to default based on seniority.  That is, the SPV 
purchases these cash flows by issuing securities differentiated by seniority. This step is called 
“tranching” (from the French word for slice, tranche).   Since tranching is based on seniority, the 
risk of loss due to default of the underlying assets is stratified, with the residual risks borne by the 
sponsor.  Little risk transfer occurs in a securitization, assuming that the pooling and tranching 
are done properly. 
 




Securitization is a significant and growing phenomenon.  Figure 3 and Table 1 provide some 
information on non-mortgage QSPV outstanding amounts.  The figure shows that the liabilities of 
non-mortgage vehicles are just short of $1.8 trillion.  Table 1 shows the breakdown by type of 
receivable.  Note that credit card receivables are the largest component of (non-mortgage) asset-
backed securities.  See Moody’s (May 29, 2003) for a discussion of the spread of securitization 
structures internationally. 
 
Closely related to securitization is asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP).  Asset-backed 
commercial paper SPVs are called “conduits.”  ABCP conduits are bankruptcy-remote SPVs that 
finance the purchase of receivables primarily through issuing commercial paper.
13  ABCP 
conduits are also very large.  The U.S. commercial paper market, as of August 2004, stood at $1.3 
trillion, having grown from $570 billion in January 1991.  Figure 4 shows the ratio of ABCP to 
total outstanding commercial paper over the last twelve years.
14   Over half of the total consists of 
ABCP. 
 
B.  The Structure of Securitization Vehicles 
 
Some of the details of the structure of credit-card securitization SPVs are important for the 
subsequent empirical work.  These details are briefly reviewed in this section. 
 
a.  Trusts – Master Trusts  
 
Securitization SPVs are invariably trusts.  The sponsor transfers receivables to the trust for the 
benefit of the certificate holders, i.e., the investors in the SPV.  Most trusts are Master Trusts, 
which allow for repeated transfers of new receivables, whenever the sponsor chooses.
15  At each 
such instance, the trust issues a series of securities (trust certificates) to investors in the capital 
markets.  Each series has an undivided interest in the assets and an allocable interest in the 
collections of the receivables in the master trust, based on the size of each series.  Trust assets that 
                                                 
13 ABCP conduits can be multi-seller, meaning that the receivables in the conduit have been originated by 
different institutions. 
 
14 ABCP conduits are an interesting topic in the own right.  See Moody’s (1993), FitchIBCA (2001), Elmer 
(1999), Croke (2003), and Standard and Poor’s (2002). 
 
15 A “discrete trust” is an SPV used for a single initial transfer of assets.  
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have not been allocated to a series are called the “seller’s interest,” discussed below.  See 
Schwarcz (2003a). 
 
Master trusts can be “socialized” or “nonsocialized,” two categories which generally refer to how 
the SPV waterfall works, i.e., how the receivables’ cash flows are internally allocated.  In 
nonsocialized trusts there is no reallocation of excess cash flow until each series is paid its full 
amount.  Socialized trusts pay the trust’s expenses, including the monthly interest to investors, 
based on the needs of individualized series.  Generally, the socialized excess spread is socialized 
across all SPV notes issued by the trust.  This means that should there be an early amortization 
event (discussed below), then all the notes go into early amortization.  In a nonsocialized trust, 
the notes have their own separate excess spreads.  See Standard and Poor’s (n.d.) for details. 
 
b.  Seller’s Interest 
 
The “seller’s interest” refers to the sponsor’s ownership of trust assets that have not been 
allocated to any series of securities issued by the trust.   The size of the seller’s interest varies 
through time as the amounts of securities issued by the SPV changes and as the balance of 
principal receivables in the trust assets changes.  The seller’s interest is usually initially set at 
seven percent. 
 
c.   Excess Spread and Early Amortization  
 
Asset-backed securities also have the general features that they involve “excess spread.”  The 
yield on the underlying loans that is paid into the trust should be high enough to cover the 
payment of interest on the asset-backed securities (ABS) tranches in addition to the servicing 
fees.  Excess spread is generally defined as finance charges collections (i.e., the gross yield on the 
underlying receivables) minus certificate interest (paid to the holders of the SPV debt), servicing 
fees (paid to the servicer of the receivables, usually the sponsor), and charge-offs (due to default 
by the underlying borrowers) allocated to the series.  For example: 
 
 
Gross Yield on Portfolio  18% 
Investors’ Weighted Avg. Coupon  - 7% 
Servicing Expense  - 2% 
Charge-Offs -  5% 





Depending on the structure of the SPV, available excess spread may be shared with other series 
(in the Master Trust), used to pay credit enhancers, deposited into a reserve account to be used to 
cover charge-offs, or released to the sponsor. 
 
Practitioners view the excess spread as providing a rough indication of the financial health of a 
transaction. Excess spread is in fact highly persistent and consequently can be used as a way to 
monitor a transaction.   
 
All credit card structures have a series of early amortization triggers, which if hit cause the 
payments to investors to be defined as principal, so that the SPVs’ liabilities are paid off early, 
that is, before the scheduled payment date.  Early amortization events include insolvency of the 
originator of the receivables, breaches of representations or warranties, a service default, failure 
to add receivables as required, and others.  Most importantly, however, a transaction will 
amortize early if the monthly excess spread falls to zero or below for three consecutive months.   
 
d.   Credit Enhancement   
 
In the most common securitization structure the SPV issues tranches of securities to the capital 
markets based on seniority.  There are senior notes, called A notes, and junior or mezzanine note 
called B notes.  A common form of credit enhancement to the more senior classes, A notes and B 
notes, is a subordinated interest known as the collateral invested amount (CIA).  The most 
subordinated interest is referred to by a number of different names, including the C class, C note, 
or collateral interest.
16  As mentioned above, C notes are typically privately placed.  This is partly 
because they are riskier, but also because they do not qualify as debt for tax purposes making 
them ERISA-ineligible.  Because they are privately placed, they are not rated, and much less 
information is available about them.  See Moody’s (November 11, 1994) on C notes. 
 
Credit enhancement for the CIA is a reserve account, which grows depending on the level of the 
excess spread.  If the excess spread is low, then excess spread is trapped inside the SPV and used 
to build up the reserve account to a specified level.  Reserve account structures vary, with 
                                                 
16 Prior to the development and widespread use of CIAs, credit card transactions employed letters of credit 
(LOCs) from highly rated institutions to protect investors against default.  CIAs became prevalent as a way 




different structures having different amounts of excess spread trapped inside the trust depending 
on different contingencies.  If the excess spread is negative, the reserve account is drawn down to 
make up the shortfall.   
 
 
C.  Implicit Recourse 
 
There are examples of recourse in credit card securitizations that are known publicly.  Moody’s 
(January 1997) gives fourteen examples of “notable instances” of voluntary support.  The earliest 
example is from May 1989 and the latest listed is November 1996.  Higgins and Mason (2004) 
study a sample of 17 implicit recourse events involving ten banks, during the period 1987 to 
2001.
17  Higgins and Mason document that firms that engage in subsidization of their SPVs “face 
long delays before returning to market.”  
 
IV.  An SPV Game 
 
In this section we analyze a simple model of off-balance sheet financing, a game played between 
a representative firm (the sponsor of the SPV) and a large number of investors.  The goal is to 
understand the source of value in the use of SPVs. 
 
For concreteness we call the sponsoring firm a bank, by which we mean any financial 
intermediary or, indeed, any firm.  We proceed by first setting out a model of the bank financing 
a portfolio of projects in a one period setting.  The bank’s efforts determine the quality of the 
projects, unbeknownst to the lenders to the bank.  Project quality is implicitly determined by 
various activities of banks, including information production, screening, and monitoring, but for 
simplicity it is modeled as an “effort” choice by the bank.
18 This provides a benchmark against 
which we can determine the value of securitization in the one period setting. 
 
We will subsequently allow for the possibility of securitization, where one project may be 
financed off-balance sheet in an SPV.  The timing is as follows: projects are allocated to be 
                                                 
17 During the period 1987-2001 Higgins and Mason (2004) report two instances of early amortization, both 
associated with the failure of the sponsoring institution, namely, Republic Bank and Southeast Bank. 
 
18 See Gorton and Winton (2003) for a review of the literature on banks’ information production, screening, 
and monitoring activities.  
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financed on- or off-balance sheet, and then the bank makes a single effort choice that determines 
the quality of both the on- and off-balance sheet projects.  To emphasize, projects are allocated 
first, and then project quality is realized.  So, the focus at this point is on the moral hazard 
problem involving effort choice, rather than on the strategic allocation of projects after their 
qualities are known (i.e., the adverse selection problem). By comparing the value of the bank 
when securitization is allowed to the benchmark bank value when there is no securitization, we 
determine the factors causing securitization to be valuable. 
 
Finally, we will allow for strategic allocation of the two projects, i.e., projects are allocated 
between the balance sheet of the bank and the balance sheet of the SPV after their qualities are 
known.  Bank project quality choice is the agency problem that lenders to the bank and to the 
SPV are concerned about.  If projects are allocated between the bank and the SPV before the 
project’s type is realized there is no strategic adverse selection problem.  The possibility of 
strategic allocation of projects adds an additional problem that investors must be concerned about.  
In this setting, the bank cannot commit to allocate a high type project to the SPV.  In the credit 
card case there are some constraints on the lemons issue because accounts to be sold to the trust 
are supposed to be chosen randomly.  In this case, the adverse selection may have more to do 
with timing of the addition of accounts depending on the state of the on-balance sheet assets, or 
perhaps with the removal of accounts.
19   
 
Without the ability to commit to transfer a high quality project to the SPV we show that no lender 
will lend to the SPV.  Off-balance sheet financing, or securitization, in this setting is not possible.  
This sets the stage for the repeated SPV game, analyzed briefly in the final part of this section.  
The point there is that repetition of the stage game between the bank and the outside investors can 
create equilibria in which an implicit contractual arrangement involving bailouts of the SPV by 
the sponsoring bank can be enforced.  By “bailouts” we mean extra-contractual support for the 
SPV, as will become clear below. 
 
A.  Model Set-Up 
 
                                                 





A competitive bank seeks to finance two one-period nondivisible projects.  Each project requires 
$1 of investment.  The bank has an amount $E<2 available to finance the two projects.  Since 
E<2, the bank must borrow D = 2 – E, promising to repay F at the end of the period.  Debt, 
however, is tax advantaged, so only (1-τ)F needs to be repaid, where τ is the relevant tax rate.  
The interest rate r in the economy is for simplicity assumed to be zero.   
 
We analyze a representative bank and a unit interval of investors.  All agents, i.e., the banks and 
the investors, are risk-neutral.  Consumption occurs at the end of the period.   
   
The bank determines the quality of its projects by expending “effort,” e∈{eH, eL}, where eH>eL, 
and such that a project returns y
H with probability e and y
L with probability (1–e), where y
H>y
L.  
The single effort choice determines the qualities of both projects, but project realizations are 










  The single effort costs h(e).  “Effort” is to be 
interpreted as the resources necessary to produce information about a project and to monitor it.  
Effort is not contractible. 
 
Projects satisfy the following assumptions: 
 
A1.  2[eHy
H + (1 – eH)y
L] – h(eH) > D, i.e., a project is a positive net present value investment 
when a high effort level is chosen, i.e., e=eH.  
 
A2. 2[eLy
H + (1 – eL)y
L] – h(eL) < D, i.e., a project is a negative net present value investment 
when a low effort choice is made, i.e., e=eL. 
 
A3.  2y







H – h(e) > y
H + y
L – h(e)  > F, for e∈{eH, eL}, i.e., default does not occur in the other states. 
 
Assumptions A3 and A4 are stated in terms of the face value of the debt, F, which is an 
endogenous variable.  Nevertheless, the point of A3 and A4 is to determine the states of the world 
when default occurs.  Default occurs only in the state {y
L, y
L}.  We will subsequently solve for 
the equilibrium F under this assumption and then verify that that value of F is consistent with  
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assumptions A3 and A4 when F is eliminated through substitution; the assumptions can then be 
stated entirely in terms of primitives. 
 
Corporations face a proportional bankruptcy cost, proportional to the realized output.  In other 
words, larger firms have higher bankruptcy costs.  This cost is borne by the creditors.  The reason 
that the bankruptcy cost is proportional, rather than lump-sum, is not only realism, but it also 
simplifies the model, as will become clear below.  The bankruptcy cost is c ∈(0,1) per unit of 
output.  A fixed bankruptcy cost could be added to this, though with binomial outcomes it has no 
additional content.  The bankruptcy cost is discussed further below. 
 
On-balance sheet debt has a tax advantage.  Off-balance sheet debt usually does not have this 
advantage.  Here the cost of using off-balance sheet debt is the loss of the tax shield to the 
sponsoring firm.  The sponsor may structure the SPV so that this cost does not exist.  In that case, 
we would point to other costs.  In general, some limit to how much can be financed off-balance 
sheet is needed for there to be an interior solution.  However, recent “whole-firm” securitizations 
suggest that there may be few limits.  See Pfister (2000). 
 
B.  Discussion of the Model 
 
The model provides a role for the bank; it has the unique ability to find high quality projects by 
making an effort.  However, this value production is not observable to outside investors since 
they cannot confirm the effort level chosen by the bank.  This is essentially the usual model of 
bank activity.  We assume that the bank issues debt to outside investors, and do not explain why 
debt is the security of choice.   Any firm transferring assets off-balance sheet has created assets of 
a certain value, which may not be known to outside investors, so the “bank” need not literally be 
taken to exclude nonfinancial firms. 
 
C.  The Benchmark Case of No Securitization 
 
We begin with the benchmark problem of the bank when there is no off-balance securitization.  In 





H – h(e) – (1–τ)F] + 2e(1 – e)[y
H + y




subject to:   (i) E(F) ≥D       (Participation  of  Investors) 
 
      ( i i )   V ( e = e H; e0=eH) ≥ V(e=eL; e0=eH)   (Incentive Compatibility) 
 
The first constraint says that the expected pay-off to the investors who purchase the bank debt, 
E(F), must be at least what was lent (D), otherwise the risk neutral investors will not lend to the 
bank (since the interest rate is zero).  The second constraint says that if investors lend to the bank 
believing that the bank will choose effort level eH, where e0 is the belief of the lenders regarding 
the bank’s effort choice, then the bank behaves consistently with these beliefs, choosing e=eH. 
 
The optimization problem is written assuming that the bank defaults only in state {y
L, y
L} as 
assumed above by A3 and A4.  
 
Note that the Participation Constraint can be written as follows, since investors get only the 
remaining cash flows net of the bankruptcy and effort costs: 
 
[e
2 + 2e (1–e)] F + (1–e)
2  [2y
L(1–c) – h(e)] ≥D. 
 
Suppose investors’ beliefs about the bank’s effort choice are e=e0.  Then the lowest promised 
repayment amount that lenders will accept, in order to lend is: 
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Incentive compatibility requires that the bank’s choice of e∈{eH, eL} be the same as what the 
lenders believe it will be, namely e0.  Suppose that beliefs are consistent, i.e., that e=e0=eH.  Then, 
indicating bank value by V





L – eH(2 – eH)h(eH) – (1– τ) [D– (1–eH)
2(2y
L(1– c) – h(eH))]. (1) 
 
If beliefs were inconsistent, that is, if lenders’ beliefs were e0=eH, but the bank chose e=eL, then 
the value of the bank is given by: 
 
V(e=eL; e0=eH) = 2eLy
H + 2eL(1 – eL)y
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Lemma 1: If:  
 
2y
H(eH – eL) + 2y
L[eH(1– eH) – eL(1 – eL)] – h(eH)eH(2 – eH) + h(eL)eL(2– eL) 
 
– (1 – τ)[D – (1– eH)
2[2y
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then at the optimum, investors believe e0=eH and the bank chooses e=eH.  The value of the bank is 
given by (1). 
 
Proof: The incentive compatibility constraint, V(e=eH; e0=eH) ≥ V(e=eL; e0=eH), is satisfied if the 
condition in the lemma holds.  It remains to verify that the equilibrium F derived under A3 and 
A4 is consistent, i.e., to state A3 and A4 in terms of primitives.  That is left to the Appendix.  // 
 
In what follows we will refer to V
H as the value of the bank when there is no securitization.  This 





D.  Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 
 
Now, suppose the bank sets up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to finance one of the projects. 
One project will be financed on-balance sheet, and one will be financed off-balance sheet.
20  The 
SPV has no bankruptcy costs, as discussed above, and its debt has no tax advantage. The effort 
choice is made at the bank level and determines the qualities of both projects, though the 
outcomes are independent, as before.
21  To be clear, the projects are first allocated to be on- or 
off-balance sheet, and then the bank makes its effort choice. 
 
On-balance sheet the bank will borrow 0.5D, promising to repay F
B at the end of the period.  Off-
balance sheet, the SPV will borrow 0.5D, promising to repay F
S at the end of the period.
22  The 
bank then has two assets on-balance sheet, its own project, and an equity claim on the SPV, i.e., if 
y is the realization of the SPV’s project, then the bank’s equity claim on the SPV at the end of the 




Assumptions analogous to A3 and A4, above, define the bankruptcy states: 
 
A3a.  2y
L – h(e) < F
B + F
S, for e∈{eH, eL}
 , i.e., default of both the bank and the SPV occurs if the 





H – h(e) > y
H + y
L – h(e)  > F
B + F
S, for e∈{eH, eL}, i.e., there need not be default of either 
entity in the other states. 
 
As before assumptions A3a and A4a are stated in terms of F
B and F
S, endogenous variables.  
Assumption A3a determines the states of the world when default definitely will occur, namely, in 
state {y
L, y
L}.  A4a states that the two projects generate sufficient payoffs in the other states to 
                                                 
20 This is assumption is made for simplicity.  The model does not determine the scale of the SPV. 
  
21 Note that no effort choice can be made by the SPV, as it is passive.  If the effort choice could be made at 
that level, the entity would be a subsidiary of the bank, rather than an SPV. 
 
22 For simplicity other financing choices are assumed to not be available. While we do not model tranching, 
it is not inconsistent with the model to allow for additional motivations for securitization beyond those we 
consider, such as clientele effects (e.g., perhaps due to ERISA-eligibility requirements) . 
 
23 Strictly speaking there is an intermediate step because the bank funds both projects initially on-balance 
sheet and then transfers one, in a true sale, to the SPV.  We assume that the proceeds from selling the 
project to the SPV are used to pay down on-balance sheet debt.  For simplicity, this step is omitted.  
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avoid bankruptcy, though whether that is the outcome or not will depend on the relationship 
between the bank and the SPV.  We will subsequently solve for the equilibrium F
B and F
S under 
these assumptions and then verify that those values of F
B and F
S are consistent with assumptions 
A3a and A4a when F is eliminated through substitution; the assumptions can then be stated 
entirely in terms of primitives. 
 




L(1–c) < 0.5D, i.e., the expected return for the bank, from the on-balance sheet 
project, in the bankruptcy state {y
L, y
L} (which occurs with probability (1–eH)
2) is 
insufficient to pay 0.5D, the amount borrowed. 
 
At the end of the period, by A3a and A4a, the possible outcomes are as follows, where the first 
element is the on-balance sheet project state realization and the second element is the off-balance 




H}:  Both projects realize y
H
; this occurs with probability e
2, e∈{eH, eL}.  In this 
event, both on- and off-balance sheet debts can be repaid in full. 
•  {y
H, y
L}:  The on-balance sheet project realizes y
H, and the SPV’s project is worth y
L.  
This occurs with probability e(1–e), e∈{eH, eL}.  The bank is solvent, but the SPV 
defaults on its debt.   
•  {y
L, y
H}:  The off-balance sheet project realizes y
H, but the bank’s project is worth y
L.  
This occurs with probability e(1-e), e∈{eH, eL}.  The SPV can honor its debt, and so can 
the bank because the bank is the equity holder of the SPV. 
•  {y
L, y
L}:  Both projects realize y
L; this occurs with probability (1–e)
2, e∈{eH, eL}.  
Neither the bank nor the SPV can honor their debt. 
 
Note that with or without securitization, the bank fails only if the realized state is {y
L, y
L}.  
Consequently, with only two states a lump-sum bankruptcy cost would always be borne in this, 
and only this, state.  This is due to the simplicity of the model. However, the proportional 
bankruptcy cost will be affected by securitization since the on-balance sheet assets have been 
reduced to one project.  In a more complicated model, with a continuous range of project  
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realizations, a fixed bankruptcy cost could be borne as a function of the bank’s leverage, which 
could be chosen endogenously.  Here, the simplicity of the model dictates use of a proportional 
bankruptcy cost.  But, clearly this is not essential for the main point. 
 
The bank’s problem is to choose F
B, F














H – h(e) – (1–τ)F
B] 
 
  s.t.   (i)   E[F
B] ≥ 0.5D      (Participation of Investors in the Bank) 
 
     (ii)  E[F
S] ≥ 0.5D      (Participation of Investors to the SPV) 
 
     (iii)  V
S(e=eH; e0=eH) ≥ V
S(e=eL; e0=eH) (Incentive  Compatibility) 
 





L(1–c) – h(e)] ≥ 0.5D. 
 




L ≥ 0.5D. 
 
As before suppose lenders’ beliefs are e0.  Then investors in the bank and SPV, respectively, will 
participate if the promised repayments are at least: 
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   s.t. (iii)  V
S(e=eH; e0=eH) ≥ V
S(e=eL; e0=eH)     (Incentive Compatibility) 
 





L – eH(2–eH)h(eH) – (1–τ)[0.5D – (1–eH)
2[y
L(1–c) – h(eH)] 
   
  –  [0.5D  –  (1–eH)y
L] .         ( 2 )  
 
Lemma 2: If  
 
2y
H(eH – eL) + y
L[eH(1–eH)-eL(1–eL)] – h(eH)eH(2–eH)+h(eL)eL(2–eL) 
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then at the optimum, lenders believe e0=eH and the bank chooses e=eH.  The value of the bank is 
given by (2). 
 
Proof: The incentive compatibility constraint, V
S(e=eH; e0=eH) ≥ V
S(e=eL; e0=eH), is satisfied if 
the condition in the lemma holds.  It remains to verify that the equilibrium F
B and F
S derived 
under A3a and A4a are consistent, i.e., to state A3a and A4a in terms of primitives.  That is left to 




Proposition 1:  If (1–eH)
2y
Lc – τ[0.5D – (1–eH)
2y
L(1–c)] > 0, then it is optimal for the bank to use 
the SPV to finance one project. 
Proof:  The condition in the proposition is a simplification of V
S – V
H > 0.  // 
The factors that effect the profitability of securitization are taxes (τ), the bankruptcy cost (c), and 
risk, as measured by (1-eH)
2, i.e., the chance of bankruptcy occurring.  Taxes matter, to the extent 
that bankruptcy does not occur, because debt issued by the SPV is not tax advantaged (by 
assumption).  The bankruptcy cost matters because expected bankruptcy costs are reduced to the 
extent that projects are financed off-balance sheet.  This is due to the legal structure of the SPV.  
Finally, the risk of bankruptcy, (1-eH)
2, makes the chance of incurring the bankruptcy cost higher. 
Corollary 1: The profitability of off-balance sheet financing is increasing in the bankruptcy cost, 
c, decreasing in the tax rate, τ, and increasing in the riskiness of the project (i.e., the chance 
of bankruptcy), (1–eH)
2. 
Proof: The derivatives of V
S – V
H with respect to c, τ, and (1–eH)
2, respectively, are: 
[] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 . 0








< 0, by A.5. 
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τ τ   // 
Corollary 1 identifies the basic drivers of SPV value, under the assumption that the projects are 
allocated to on- or off- balance sheet before their quality if known, i.e., there is no adverse 
selection.   
 
E.   Securitization with Moral Hazard and Strategic Adverse Selection 
 
Now, suppose that the bank makes an effort choice, i.e., e∈{eH, eL}, but then after observing the 
realized project qualities, one of the projects is allocated to the SPV. Recall that project quality is  
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not verifiable.  This means that investors in the debt issued by the SPV face an additional 
problem.  In addition to the moral hazard associated with the effort choice, there is an adverse 
selection problem with regard to which project is allocated to the SPV.  Call this problem the 
“strategic adverse selection problem.” 
 




H + (1 – eH
2)y
L  <  0.5D. 
 
The meaning of A6 will become clear shortly. 
 
With the possibility of strategic adverse selection, at the end of the period, the possible outcomes 




H}:  Both projects realize y
H
; this occurs with probability e
2.  The bank 
allocates one of the y
H projects to the SPV and retains the other one on-balance sheet.  
Both on- and off-balance sheet debts can be repaid in full. 
•  {y
H, y
L} and  {y
L, y
H}: The realization of projects is: one y
H and one y
L.  This 
occurs with probability 2e(1–e).  In both of these states of the world, the bank keeps the 
y
H project on-balance sheet and allocates the y
L project to the SPV. The bank is solvent, 
but the SPV defaults on its debt. 
•  {y
L, y
L}:  Both projects realize y
L; this occurs with probability (1–e)
2.  One of the 
y
L projects is allocated to the SPV and the bank retains the other on-balance sheet.   
Neither the bank nor the SPV can honor its debt. 
 
In the previous section the SPV failed in two states of the world, the two situations where it 
realized y
L.  Now, the SPV fails in three states of the world, due to the strategic adverse selection 
problem.  Only if  {y
H, y
H} is realized will the SPV be solvent.  So, the expected income of the 
SPV is: e
2y






L.  But this is less than 0.5D, by A6.   
Consequently, no investor will lend to the SPV.  Recognizing this problem, the bank would like 
to commit to not engage in strategic adverse selection; the bank would like to commit to allocate 
projects prior to the realization of the project outcome.  But there is no way to do this because 




Imagine for a moment that the bank could commit to subsidize the SPV in the event that the SPV 
realized y
L and the bank realized y
H.  Shortly, we will make clear what “subsidize” means.  Let 
F
SC be the face value of the debt issued by the SPV under commitment (and F
C the corresponding 
face value of the debt issued by the bank).  Then at the end of the period, the possible outcomes 




H}:  Both projects realize y
H
; this occurs with probability e
2.  Both on- and off-
balance sheet debts can be repaid in full.  The expected profit to the bank in this case is: 
e
2 [2y





L}: The bank’s project is worth y
H and the SPV’s is worth y
L.  This occurs with 
probability e(1-e).  The bank is solvent and subsidizes the SPV, so that neither defaults 
on its debt.  “Subsidize” means that the bank assumes responsibility for the debt of the 
SPV.  The bank’s expected profit in this state of the world is: 
e(1–e)[y
H + y





H}:  The bank’s project is worth y
L and the SPV’s is worth y
H.  This occurs with 
probability e(1-e).  The SPV is solvent.  Without the return on its SPV equity the bank 
would be insolvent.  But the SPV has done well so that neither defaults on its debt.  The 









L}:  Both projects realize y
L; this occurs with probability (1–e)
2.  Neither the bank 
nor the SPV can honor its debt.  The bank earns zero. 
 
With this commitment, the bank’s problem is to choose F
C, F














s.t. (i)  E[F




   (ii)  E[F
SC] ≥ 0.5D      (Participation of SPV Investors) 
 
    (iii)  V
C(e=eH; e0=eH) ≥ V
C(e=eL; e0=eH)  (Incentive Compatibility) 
 










L ≥ 0.5D. 
 
We proceed as above and suppose lenders’ beliefs are e0.  Then lenders will participate in lending 
to the bank and the SPV, respectively, if the promised repayments are at least: 
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L – eH(2-eH)h(eH) – (1–τ)[0.5D – (1–eH)
2[y
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– [0.5D – (1–eH)
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L]       (3) 
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then at the optimum, lenders believe e0=eH and the bank chooses e=eH.  The value of the 
bank is given by (3). 
 
Proof:  The incentive compatibility constraint, V
C(e=eH; e0=eH) ≥ V
C(e=eL; e0=eH), is satisfied if 
the condition in the lemma holds.  // 
 
Proposition 2: If the bank can commit to subsidize the SPV, then the profitability of the bank is 
the same as it would be when projects were allocated between the bank and the SPV prior to their 
realizations, i.e., when there was no strategic adverse selection. 
 
Proof: It may be verified that V
S = V
C.  //  
 
Intuitively, while the debt is repriced to reflect the subsidy from the bank in the state {y
H, y
L}, 
there are no effects involving the bankruptcy cost or taxes.  Consequently, the bank’s value is the 
same as when projects were allocated between the bank and the SPV prior to their realizations. 
 
Proposition 2 states that securitization would be feasible, i.e., investors would lend to the SPV, 
and it would be profitable for the bank (under the conditions stated in Proposition 1), if it were 
possible to overcome the problem of strategic adverse selection by the bank committing to 
subsidize the SPV.  However, accounting and regulatory rules prohibit such a commitment, even 
if it were possible. That is, a formal contract, which can be upheld in court and which is 
consistent with accounting and regulatory rules, effectively would not be consistent with the SPV 
being a QSPV, and hence the debt would not be off-balance sheet.  The bankruptcy costs would 
not be minimized.  We now turn to the issue of whether a commitment is implicitly possible in a 
repeated context. 
 
F.  The Repeated SPV Game: The Implicit Recourse Equilibrium 
 
In any single period, the bank cannot securitize a project because lenders will not lend to the SPV 
due to the strategic adverse selection problem.  We now consider an infinite repetition of the one 
period problem, where for simplicity we assume that the bank has exactly $E available every  
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period to finance the two projects.
24  The one-shot-game outcome of no securitization can be 
infinitely repeated, so this is an equilibrium of the repeated game.  However, the idea that 
repetition can expand the set of equilibria, when commitment is possible, is familiar from the 
work of Friedman (1971), Green and Porter (1984), and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), among 
others.  The usual context is oligopolistic competition, where the competing firms are 
incompletely informed about their rivals’ decisions.  The firms want to collude to maintain 
oligopolistic profits, but cannot formally commit to do so.  Here the context is somewhat 
different.  The sponsoring bank and the investors in the SPV “collude” in adopting a contractual 
mechanism that cannot be written down because of accounting and regulatory rules.  In a sense 
the two parties are colluding against the accountants and regulators.  We will call such an 
equilibrium an “Implicit Recourse Equilibrium.” 
 
For this section we will suppose that the interest rate, r, is positive and constant.  This means that 
everywhere there was a “D” above, it must be replaced by (1+r)D, as the risk neutral investors 
require that they earn an expected rate of return of r. 
 
The basic idea of repeating the SPV game is as follows.  Suppose investors believe that the bank 
will subsidize the SPV in the state {y
H, y
L}, when the SPV would otherwise default.  I.e., 
investors have priced the debt as F
C and F
SC, as given above, and their beliefs are e0=eH.  Now, 
suppose that the state {y
H, y
L} occurs, that is, the state of the world where the bank is supposed to 
subsidize the SPV.  The realized bank profit is supposed to be: 
 
  y
H  + y




But, suppose the bank reneges and leaves the SPV bankrupt with y
L – F
SC < 0, i.e., there is no 







                                                 
24 In other words, we assume that if the bank does well it pays a dividend such that E remains as the equity 
in the bank.  If the bank does poorly, we assume that the bank can obtain more equity so that again there is 
E.  Obviously, this omits some interesting dynamics about the bank’s capital ratio and begs the question of 




So, the one-shot gain from reneging on the implicit contract is F
SC–y
L>0.  Since this is positive, 
the bank has an incentive to renege.  But, in a repeated setting, investors can punish the bank by 
not investing in the bank’s SPV in the future, say for N periods.  If the bank cannot securitize 
again for N periods, it loses (from Proposition 1): 
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where δ is the discount rate.  Obviously, the bank will not renege on subsidizing the SPV if the 
expected present value of the loss is greater than the one-shot gain to deviating.  There are 
combinations of N and δ that will support the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium.  While this is the 
intuition for Implicit Recourse Equilibrium, it clearly depends on the beliefs of the investors and 
the bank.  There may be many such equilibria, with very complicated, history dependent, 
punishment strategies. 
 
The idea is for the investors in the SPV to enforce support when needed by the threat of refusing 
to invest in SPV debt in the future if the sponsoring firm deviates from the implicit contract.  This 
means that there is a “punishment period” where investors refuse to invest in SPV debt if the 
sponsor has not supported the SPV in the past.  In general, strategies can be path dependent in 
complicated ways (See Abreu (1988)).  However, a simple approach is to restrict attention to 
punishments involving playing the no-SPV stage game equilibrium for some period of time, 
starting the period after a deviation has been detected.  We adopt this approach and assume 
investor and bank beliefs are consistent with this. 
 
For simplicity we will construct a simple example of an Implicit Recourse Equilibrium.  Assume 
that all agents discount at the rate r, and consider the case where N = ∞.  This corresponds to a 
“punishment period” of forever.
25  At the start of each period the game proceeds as follows: 
 
1.  The bank and the SPV offer debt in the capital markets to investors with face 
values of F
C and F
SC, respectively.   
 
2.  Investors choose which type of debt, and how much, to buy. 
 
                                                 
25We do not claim that this is the optimal punishment period.  
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If investors purchase the SPV debt, then off-balance sheet financing proceeds.  Otherwise the 
bank finances both projects on-balance sheet. 
 
At the end of a period, the state of the world is observed, but cannot be verified.  If the state of the 
world is {y
H, y
L}, i.e., the on-balance sheet project returns y
H while the off-balance sheet project 
returns y
L, then the bank is supposed to subsidize the SPV, as described above.  At the start of any 
period, both the banks and investors know all the previous outcomes. 
 
Consider the following trigger strategy based on investor and bank beliefs: If the bank ever does 
not subsidize the SPV when the state of the world is {y
H, y
L}, then investors never again invest in 
the SPV because they believe that the sponsor will not support it and hence the promised interest 
rate, corresponding to F
SC, is too low.  The bank believes that if it deviates investors will never 
again buy its SPV’s debt in the market.  Then a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists under 
certain conditions: 
 
Proposition 3 (Existence of the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium):  If there exists an 
interest rate, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, such that the following quadratic inequality is satisfied, 
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then securitization is feasible and optimal for any bank that would choose securitization 
were it able to commit to the policy of subsidization.  
 
Proof: Consider a bank that would choose securitization were it able to commit to subsidize its 
SPV in the state {y
H, y
L}.  Also, consider a date at which the bank has always subsidized its SPV 
in the past.  Over the next period the bank is worth V
SC if it securitizes one project off-balance 
sheet and retains the other on balance sheet.  If both projects are financed on-balance sheet, the 
bank is worth V
H.  By Propositions 1 and 2, V
C > V
H.  The present value of this difference is the 
benefit to the bank of being able to utilize off-balance sheet financing, assuming that it continues  
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to subsidize its SPV in the state {y
H, y
L}.  Over the infinite horizon this annuity value is: (V
C– 
V
H)/r.  (Recall that agents discount at rate r.) 
 
At the end of the period, suppose that the state of the world is, in fact, {y
H, y
L}.  Consider a one-
shot deviation by the bank.  That is, the bank decides not to subsidize the SPV, when investors 
expect the bank to subsidize it.  From the expressions given above, the benefit to the bank of such 
a deviation is: 
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To decide whether to deviate or not the bank compares the costs and benefits of deviation and 
chooses to subsidize the SPV as long as:  
 









Substituting in this equation for V
C, V
H, and F
SC and simplifying (after some algebra) gives the 
quadratic inequality in the proposition. // 
 
Obviously, other equilibria could exist.  But, the point is that there can exist equilibria where the 
costs of bankruptcy are avoided by using off-balance sheet financing. 
 
G.  Summary and Empirical Implications 
 
The conclusion of the above analysis is that the value of SPVs lies in their ability to minimize 
expected bankruptcy costs; securitization arises to avoid bankruptcy costs.  By financing the firm 
in pieces, control rights to the business decisions are separated from the financing decisions.  The 
sponsor maintains control over the business while the financing is done via SPVs that are passive, 
that is, there are no control rights associated with the SPVs’ assets. Bankruptcy is a process of 
transferring control rights over corporate assets.  Off-balance sheet financing reduces the amount 




We have argued that the ability to finance off-balance sheet via the debt of SPVs is critically 
dependent on a relational, or implicit, contract between the SPV sponsor and investors.   The 
relational contract depends upon repeated use of off-balance sheet financing.  We showed that 
this repetition can lead to an equilibrium with implicit recourse. Such an equilibrium implements 
the outcome of the equilibrium with formal commitments, were such contracts possible. The 
comparative static properties of the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium are based on the result that the 
equilibrium outcomes of the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium are the same as the commitment 
equilibrium. 
 
The idea of a relational contract supporting the feasibility of SPVs leads to our first set of 
empirical tests, namely, that the trigger strategy can only provide intertemporal incentives for the 
sponsor insofar as the sponsor exists.  If the sponsor is so risky that there is a chance the sponsor 
will fail, and be unable to support the SPV, then investors will not purchase the SPV debt.  We 
examine this idea by testing the proposition that investors, in pricing the debt of the SPV, care 
about the risk of the sponsor defaulting, above and beyond the risks of the SPV’s assets. 
 
The second hypothesis that we empirically investigate is suggested by Corollary 1.  Because the 
Implicit Recourse Equilibrium implements the outcome with formal commitment, Corollary 1 
also describes the repeated equilibrium with implicit recourse.  Corollary 1 says that the 
profitability of off-balance sheet financing is increasing in the bankruptcy cost, c, and increasing 
in the riskiness of the project (i.e., the chance of bankruptcy), (1–eH).  In other words, riskier 
sponsors should securitize more, ceteris paribus. Bankruptcy costs are not observable, but the 
riskiness of the firm can be proxied for by its firm bond rating.   
 
V.  Data 
 
The rest of the paper examines some evidence that is supportive of our model. Our analysis 
suggests that the risk of a sponsoring firm should, because of implicit recourse, affect the risk of 
the ABS that are issued by its SPVs. We measure the sponsor’s risk by its bond rating, and focus 
on two ways that this risk might be manifested. As mentioned above, we first consider whether 
investors care about the strength of the sponsoring firm, above and beyond the characteristics of 
the ABS themselves.  Second, we consider whether riskier firms are more likely to securitize in 




To investigate our first topic, investors’ sensitivity to the sponsor’s strength, we obtained from 
Moody’s a unique dataset describing every credit-card ABS issued between 1988:06 and 1999:05 
that Moody’s tracked. This covers essentially all credit-card ABS through mid 1999. The dataset 
includes a detailed summary of the structure of each ABS, including the size and maturity of each 
ABS tranche. It summarizes the credit enhancements behind each tranche, such as the existence 
of any letters of credit, cash collateral accounts, and reserve accounts. Moody’s also calculated 
the amount of direct subordination behind each A and B tranche.
26 These variables contain the 
information about the ABS structure that investors observed at the time of issuance.  Further, the 
dataset includes some information about the asset collateral underlying each ABS, such as the age 
distribution of the credit-card accounts. Also included is the month-by-month ex post 
performance of each note, in particular the excess spread and its components like the chargeoff 
rate. The sample used below includes only the A and B tranches, i.e., the tranches that were sold 
publicly. 
 
Although it is difficult to find pricing information on credit-card ABS, we obtained from Lehman 
Brothers a dataset containing the initial yields on a large subset of these bonds that were issued in 
1997-1999, for both the A and B notes. We obtained similar data from Asset Sales Reports for 
bonds that were issued before 1997. We computed the initial spread as the initial yield minus one 
month LIBOR at the time of issuance.  We also collected Moody’s ratings from Bloomberg for 
the sponsors of each ABS in the Moody’s dataset above, which are typically banks. We use the 
bank’s senior unsecured bond rating at issuance.
27    
 
To investigate our second topic, an analysis of which banks securitize, we use the bank (‘entity’) -
level Call Report panel data that comes from the regulatory filings that banks file each quarter, 
from 1991:09 - 2000:06. Before 1996 we use only the third quarter (September) data, since credit 
card securitizations were reported only in the third quarter during that period. We also obtained 
from Moody’s a large dataset of all of their ratings of banks’ long-term senior obligations, 
                                                 
26 E.g., the amount of subordination behind the A note is calculated as (BalB+BalC)/(BalA+BalB+BalC), 
where BalX is the size (the balance) of tranche X when it exists. The dataset provided the current amount 
of subordination using current balances. For our analysis below, we want the original amount of 
subordination at the time of issuance. We were able to estimate this given the original balance sizes of the 
A and B notes, as well as an estimate of the size of any C note. The size of C notes is not directly publicly 
available, but we backed out their current size from the reported current amount of subordination behind 
the B notes. We used this to estimate the original amount of subordination behind the A and B notes.  
 




including an ID variable that allowed us to match this data to the Call Report ID variables.  
Accordingly our sample includes all the banks in the Call Report dataset for which we have a 
matching rating.
28 This yields a sample of almost 400 banks and over 5000 bank-quarters, which 
is large relative to the samples analyzed in previous related literature.  
 
 
VI.  Empirical Tests: Are there Implicit Recourse Commitments? 
 
In this section we analyze the determinants of the spread on the notes issued by the SPV to the 
capital markets. Borgman and Flannery (1997) also analyze asset-backed security spreads, over 
the period 1990-1995. They find that credit card ABS require a lower market spread if the 
sponsoring firm is a bank or if the sponsor includes guarantees as a form of credit enhancement.  
 
The unit of observation is a transaction, that is a note issuance, either the A note or the B note.  
We examine the cross sectional determinants of the spreads.  The spreads provide us with 
investors’ assessment of the risk factors behind each note. All the A notes were on issuance rated 
AAA by Moody’s.
29 If these ratings are sufficient statistics for default, then the probability of 
default should be the same for all the A notes and in the simplest case (e.g., if there is no implicit 
recourse) presumably investors would pay the same initial price for them. As discussed above, to 
test for the existence of a relational contract allowing for recourse, we examine whether other 
factors affect the ratings of the notes, in particular whether the strength of the sponsor matters, as 
estimated by its senior unsecured credit rating at the time of issuance.  Specifically, we estimate 
equations of the following form: 
 
 Spreadi,j,k,t =  β0’Timet + β1’Structurei + β2’Assetsi + β3’Trustj + β4’Ratingk,t + εi,j,k,t,  (4) 
 
where Spreadi,j,k,t is the initial spread (net of one month LIBOR) on note i from trust j and sponsor 
k at the time t of issuance. Time is a vector of year dummies that control for time varying risk 
premia as well as all other macroeconomic factors, including the tremendous growth in the ABS 
market over the sample period. Structurei represents the structure of tranche i at the time of 
issuance, such as the degree of subordination and other credit enhancements supporting it, and 
                                                 
28 Since small banks are less likely to be rated, matches are most common for the larger banks. 
 
29 All but two of the B notes were initially rated A; the two exceptions were rated AA. By distinguishing 




Assetsi represents the quality of the credit-card assets underlying the tranche at that time. Trustj 
is a vector of trust dummies. Ratingk,t is the senior unsecured bond rating of the sponsor k of the 
notes’ trust at the time of issuance. The trust dummies control for all trust fixed effects. Since 
many sponsors have multiple trusts, the dummies also essentially control for sponsor fixed 
effects.
30 Given this, the ratings variable will essentially capture the effect of changes in a 
sponsor’s rating over time.  
 
Our initial sample includes only the A notes, but later we add the B notes, with Structure then 
including an indicator for the B notes (Junior). Table 2 presents summary statistics for the key 
variables used in the analysis, for the sample of A notes. The sample runs from 1988-1999. Over 
that time the average A-note spread was just under 50 basis points (b.p.), with a relatively large 
standard deviation of 68 b.p. About half of the sponsors have ratings of single A (RatingA) on 
their senior unsecured debt, with the rest being about equally likely to have ratings of AA 
(RatingAA) or  ratings of Baa and Ba (RatingB).  
 
 
A.  Analysis of the A-Note Spreads 
 
Table 3 shows the results for the A notes. Column (1) includes only the year dummies (omitting 
1988
31) and the sponsor ratings (as well as the trust fixed effects). Nonetheless, the adjusted R
2 is 
already relatively large. The year dummies are significant, with spreads peaking in the early 
1990s, perhaps due to the recession. The sponsor ratings at the bottom of the table are of primary 
interest. Relative to the omitted AA-rated sponsors, the effects of riskier sponsor ratings is 
positive and monotonic. The coefficient RatingB for the riskiest (Baa and Ba) sponsors is 
statistically significant. Thus investors do indeed require higher yields for bonds issued by the 
trusts of riskier sponsors. That is, even though the A notes all have the same bond ratings, the 
strength of the sponsor also matters, consistent with our model. This effect is also economically 
significant. The riskiest sponsors must pay an additional 46 b.p. on average, which is about the 
same size as the average A-note spread and sizable relative to the standard deviation of spreads in 
Table 2.  This is a relatively strong result given the trust dummies which control for all average 
and time-invariant effects. The variation in a sponsor’s rating over time is sufficient to cause 
significant changes over time in the yields paid by its ABS.  
                                                 
30 Though a given trust can also have multiple owners over time, e.g. after a merger or acquisition. 
 





This result could be interpreted as suggesting that, even if the rating agencies place some weight 
on the risk of a sponsor in assessing the risk of their ABS notes, they do not do so fully.  But the 
bond ratings are discretized, not continuous-valued, so there can be some differences in risk even 
among bonds with the same ratings. Also, investors’ views of the risk might not completely 
coincide with the views of the ratings agencies. Hence we also directly control for the potential 
risk factors observable by investors.  The next columns start by adding controls for the structure 
of the A notes. Of course, this structure is endogenous (but predetermined by the time of 
issuance) and should itself reflect the rating agencies’ view of the notes’ risk. Recall that the trust 
dummies already controlled for all time-invariant trust effects. These dummies are always jointly 
significant (unreported). For instance, some trusts might get locked into an older trust-structure 
technology that is considered riskier.  
 
Column (2) explicitly controls for the amount of direct subordination behind each A note. 
LowSub represents the quartile of notes with the smallest amount of subordination (i.e., the 
riskiest notes as measured by the relative size of their ‘buffer’, ceteris paribus). It has a 
significant positive coefficient. Thus, the notes with less enhancement have to offer investors 
higher yields to compensate. Nonetheless, the coefficients on the ratings variables change very 
little.
32 Column (3) adds as a control the expected maturity of the notes (Maturity).  It also adds 
the size of the sellers’ interest (SellersInt) and a dummy variable for whether the note is fixed rate 
or not (FixedRt).  The results indicate that longer maturity and fixed-rate notes pay significantly 
higher spreads.
33 Given these controls the subordination measure (LowSub) becomes 
insignificant. This could mean that the size of the subordination might be a function of, among 
other things, maturity and whether the deal is fixed rate. Despite these effects, again the 
coefficients on the ratings do not change much. Column (4) controls for additional credit 
enhancement features, specifically dummy variables for the presence of a cash collateral account 
(I_CCA), a letter of credit (I_LOC), an internal reserve fund (I_RES), or other enhancement 
(I_Other).  Given the other covariates, these additional enhancements are individually and jointly 
insignificant.  (Though as indicated in Table 2, only CCAs are frequently used.) But the sponsor 
ratings remain significant.   
                                                 
32 Since LowSub is often missing, the sample size is smaller than in column (1). Nonetheless our 
conclusions below persist under the larger sample available if we do not control for LowSub. 
 





Finally, column (5) includes measures of the riskiness of the underlying portfolio of credit card 
receivables. Again, these are variables that the rating agencies take into account when approving 
the bond structure with a given rating, so their effects could already have been taken into account. 
The variable “Seasoned” is an indicator for older portfolios, with an average account age above 
24 months. Since older accounts tend to have lower probabilities of default, this should reflect a 
safer portfolio.
34 Chargeoff is the initial (ex post) chargeoff rate in the portfolio.
35 Both variables 
are statistically significant, with the intuitive signs. Riskier portfolios, whether unseasoned or 
with higher charge-off rates, must pay higher spreads. While Chargeoff is an ex post chargeoff 
rate, the conclusions are the same on instrumenting for it using the balance-weighted average 
chargeoff rate in the trust from the month before the issuance of each note in the sample. Even 
with these controls, the sponsor’s rating remains significant.
36 
 
B.  Analysis of the A-Note and B-Note Spreads  
 
Table 4 repeats this analysis using both the A and B notes. All regressions now include an 
indicator variable (Junior) for the B notes. In column (1), this indicator is significantly positive, as 
expected given the greater risk of the B notes. They must pay on average 29 b.p. more than the A 
notes. The coefficient on the riskiest sponsors, RatingB, remains significant and large at 42 b.p. 
Thus the extra yield that must be paid by risky sponsors is even larger than the extra yield that 
must be paid by B notes.  In column (2), LowSub indicates the A notes with the lowest quartile of 
subordination, and LowSubJr indicates the B notes with the lowest quartile of subordination. The 
latter variable is significant (and drives out the direct effect of the Junior indicator), implying that 
                                                 
34 For an account-level analysis of the determinants of default probabilities, see e.g. Gross and Souleles 
(2002). For a portfolio-level analysis, see Musto and Souleles (2004). The original age data reflects the age 
of the accounts across the entire trust as of a given time. To estimate the age distribution of accounts 
underlying a given note at the time of issuance, we subtracted the time since closing. This assumes that the 
composition of the assets did not change too much between the time of closing and the time of reporting. 
 
35 We take it from month three after issuance, since the excess spread components are sometimes missing in 
months one and two. 
 
36 We also tried various extensions. For instance, we controlled for the importance of (on-balance sheet) 
credit card balances and other consumer receivables relative to total assets (CC/Assets). (When available 
from “Moody’s Credit Opinions”, CC/Assets is consumer receivables relative to assets.  Otherwise, it is 
credit card balances relative to total assets from the Call Report data. In the latter case, in any given year 
CC/Assets is taken from the September quarter, and for 1988-90, it is taken from 1991:09.)  CC/Assets had 
a significant negative effect on spreads, but did not change the results regarding the ratings. This suggests 
that the latter effect might not reflect just a correlation between the assets in the trust and the assets on-
balance sheet, since presumably the credit card assets in the trust are more highly correlated with the credit 
card assets on-balance sheet, compared to other on-balance sheet assets.  
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B notes with less enhancement must pay higher yields. The rest of the analysis is analogous to 
that in Table 3, and the conclusions are the same.  
 
Overall, the estimated effects of the sponsors’ ratings appear to be robust. Even controlling for 
the ABS structure and underlying assets, the ratings of the sponsors remain significant, both 
statistically and economically. This supports our theoretical conclusion that the strength of the 
sponsor matters, because of the possibility of implicit recourse commitment.  To reiterate, the 
trigger strategy at the root of the relational contract concerning recourse requires that the sponsor 
exist, that is, have not defaulted.  The results are consistent with the investors in the ABS markets 




VII.  Empirical Tests: Which Firms Securitize? 
 
In this section we turn to testing whether riskier firms securitize more than others.  Since our 
model is of course highly stylized we analyze more generally the determinants of securitization.  
We estimate equations of the following form, using the Call Report panel data from quarters 
1991:09 - 2000:06: 
 
 Securitizei,t =  β0’Timet + β1’Banki + β2’Xi,t + β3’Ratingi,t + ui,t,        (5) 
 
where Securitizei,t reflects the extent of credit-card securitization by bank i at time t, measured in 
one of three ways: i) We start with logit models of the probability that bank i has securitized, with 
dependent variable I_Sec being an indicator for whether the bank has any securitized credit card 
loans outstanding at time t (the extensive margin). ii) We also estimate Tobit models where the 
dependent variable Sec/Assets measures the amount of these securitizations normalized by total 
bank assets (including the securitized loans).
37 iii) To distinguish the intensive margin component 
in ii) from the extensive margin in i), we also estimate conditional OLS models of  Sec/Assets 
conditional on Sec/Assets>0.
38  
                                                 
37 We include the securitized loans in assets in the denominator for convenience in interpreting Sec/Assets 
as a fraction ≤ 1. The denominator can also be interpreted as managed assets, although we do not have 
information on the full extent of off-balance sheet assets (including non-credit card assets) under 
management. Our conclusions are similar on not including the securitized loans in the denominator.  
 




The dependent variables again include a full set of time dummies, this time quarter dummies. Xi,t 
controls for various bank characteristics over time. In particular it includes cubic polynomials in 
bank i’s total assets, Assetsi,t, and in its share of credit card balances in total assets, CC/Assetsi,t. 
These control for scale effects, including costs that might arise in setting up and maintaining 
securitization trusts. We also control for the bank’s capital ratio (equity capital divided by assets), 
CapRatioi,t, again using a cubic polynomial.
39 Some specifications also control for all average and 
time-invariant bank effects (Banki), using the corresponding fixed effects estimator. Ratingi,t is 
the Moody’s rating of a bank’s long-term senior obligations. Given the bank effects, the ratings 
variable will capture only within-bank variation, i.e., the effect of changes in a bank’s rating over 
time on its propensity to securitize.
40 
 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the key variables, for the entire sample period 1991-2000. 
To highlight the changes in the credit card ABS market over time, the second panel shows the 
same statistics for the end of the sample period (the first half of 2000). Comparing the panels 
shows the large growth in the market over the period. The fraction of banks that securitized 
(I_Sec) increased from about 8% in the early-to-mid 1990s to 15% at the end of the sample 
period, averaging about 11% overall during the period. The magnitude of securitizations relative 
to assets (Sec/Assets) increased from about 1.6% to 4.1% over the sample period, averaging 
3.3%. The average bank rating declined over the sample period, though this happened for both the 
banks that securitized and those that did not.  
 
Further, at any given time there is substantial cross-sectional variation across banks in the 
incidence and amount of securitization and in their ratings. The raw data suggest potential scale 
effects, with the big securitizers often being the bigger banks. These include highly rated 
securitizers, such as Citibank NV with an AA rating and Sec/Assets averaging about 71%. By 
contrast firms like Advanta (Sec/Assets ≈ 70%), Capital One (≈ 57%), and Colonial (≈ 65%) have 
lower ratings (RatingB). Given the potential problem of unobserved heterogeneity, our fixed 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
39 We did not include the securitized loans (Sec) in assets in the denominator of CC/Assets or CapRatio, in 
order to avoid creating spurious correlations between these variables and the dependent variables (I_Sec 
and Sec/Assets). Calomiris and Mason (2004) discuss the relation between securitization and capital ratios. 
 
40 The sample drops the few bank observations (about 10 banks) rated C and single B. Most of these were 
small banks in the early 1990s that did not securitize (only 1 of these banks securitized). As a result, they 
tended to be automatically dropped from the fixed effects estimation (or otherwise, their effect was 
imprecisely estimated due to their small sample size).   
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effects estimators forego exploiting the purely cross-sectional average difference across banks; 
instead they set a high standard by relying on the more limited, but still substantial, within-bank 
variation over time in the incidence and amount of securitization and in the ratings. For instance, 
many banks were downgraded or upgraded at various times. Also, some banks securitized in only 
a few years (apparently just trying it out), whereas others securitized frequently but in varying 
amounts over time.    
 
The main results are in Table 6. Column (1) begins with a logit model of the probability of 
securitizing (I_Sec), without bank effects. The effects of total assets (Assets), the importance of 
credit card assets (CC/Assets), and the capital ratio (CapRatio) are each jointly significant. Given 
the other covariates, in this specification the probability of securitizing is not monotonic in 
Assets; after initially increasing with Assets, it later declines. The probability of securitizing 
generally increases with CC/Assets (though declines a bit as CC/Assets gets very large). This 
could mean that having a large portfolio of credit cards provides economies of scale in 
securitizing. Also, the probability of securitizing is not monotonic in CapRatio (but increases for 
large CapRatio).  
 
Of primary interest, at the bottom of the table, in this first specification the banks’ ratings have a 
statistically significant, though non-monotonic, effect. Relative to the omitted AA ratings, the 
middle (RatingA) banks are somewhat less likely to securitize. Nonetheless, the riskiest 
(RatingB) are indeed much more likely to securitize.  
 
Column (2) estimates a Tobit model of the amount of securitization (Sec/Assets). The conclusions 
are similar to those in the previous column. In both of these specifications, and those that follow, 
the pseudo and adjusted R2 statistics are relatively large.  
 
The remaining columns control for bank fixed effects. Column (3) uses the fixed effects logit 
estimator. Note that as a result the sample size significantly declines, since this estimator drops 
banks for which I_Sec does not vary over time. Now the effect of Assets is monotonically 
increasing, though CC/Assets is less monotonic and CapRatio becomes insignificant. More 
importantly, both RatingA and RatingB have significant positive effects, with a larger effect for 
the latter. Thus these results suggest that the probability of securitizing does indeed increase 
monotonically with banks’ riskiness, consistent with our model. Column (4) instead focuses on 
the intensive margin, estimating a conditional OLS model of the fraction of securitized assets 
conditional on Sec/Assets>0. CapRatio now has a monotonically increasing effect, though Assets  
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has a negative effect on the intensive margin, and CC/Assets is not monotonic. While RatingA is 
positive but insignificant, RatingB has a larger positive coefficient, significant at the 6% level. 
Relative to banks with AA ratings, those with B ratings have about a 3.4 percentage point (p.p.) 
larger securitization fraction, on average. This is an economically significant effect, given that it 
is comparable in magnitude to the average Sec/Assets fraction of about 3.3 p.p. 
 
Overall we conclude that there is some evidence that riskier firms are more likely to securitize, 
consistent with our model, though the effect is not always monotonic, depending on the 
specification.





C.  Summary 
 
The empirical results are consistent with the theory proposed above, namely that an implicit 
contractual relationship between SPV sponsors and capital markets investors reduces bankruptcy 
costs.  Consistent with the prediction that in the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium investors would 
price the risk of the sponsor defaulting, and hence being unable to subsidize the SPV, we found 
that the risk of the sponsor (as measured by the sponsor’s bond rating) was consistently 
significant.   The prediction of the model that firms with high expected bankruptcy costs would 
be the largest users of off-balance sheet financing was also generally confirmed. 
 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
 
Off-balance sheet financing is a pervasive phenomenon.  It allows sponsoring firms to finance 
themselves by separating control rights over assets from financing.  The operating entity, that is, 
the sponsoring firm, maintains control rights over the assets that generate cash flows.  The assets 
(projects) can be financed by selling the cash flows to an SPV that has no need for control rights, 
because the cash flows have already been generated.  We have argued that this arrangement is 
efficient because there is no need to absorb dead-weight bankruptcy costs with respect to cash 
                                                 
41 We also tried various extensions. For instance, to see whether the ratings in turn might reflect the amount 
of securitization, we tried instrumenting for the ratings using lagged ratings. However it is not clear how 
long a lag would be best. At the extreme, we used the ratings from 1991:06, the quarter before the sample 
period starts. Given how small the credit card ABS market was at the time, it is unlikely that those ratings 
were significantly affected by securitization. The results were generally insignificant. This is not surprising, 
given the smaller sample size (since the 1991 ratings are not always available) and reduced amount of 
variation.   
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flows that have already been generated.  Bankruptcy is a process for transferring control of the 
corporate assets so that new cash flows can be efficiently generated.  Off-balance sheet financing 
is about financing new projects by using cash flows already generated as collateral.  We showed 
that the efficient use of off-balance sheet financing is facilitated by an implicit arrangement, or 
contractual relations, between sponsoring firms and investors.   The empirical tests, utilizing 
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Lemma 1 Completion:  It remains to verify that the equilibrium F derived under assumptions A3 
and A4 is consistent.  That is, we now restate assumptions A3 and A4 in terms of primitives.  
Recall A3 was stated as: 2y
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Substituting the expression for F into A3 and simplifying gives: 
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which is A3 stated in terms of primitives and consistent with the equilibrium. 
 
Recall A4 was stated as: 2y
H – h(e) > y
H + y
L – h(e)  > F.  Substitute the equilibrium value of F 
into y
H + y
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Lemma 2 Completion:  It remains to verify that the equilibrium F
B and F
S derived under A3a 
and A4a are consistent.  That is, we now restate assumptions A3a and A4a in terms of primitives.  
Recall A3a: 2y
L – h(e) < F
B + F
S.  The equilibrium F
B and F
S are given by: 
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which is A3a stated in terms of primitives and consistent with the equilibrium. 
 
Recall A4a: 2y
H – h(e) > y
H + y
L – h(e)  > F
B + F





L – h(e)  > F, and simplify to obtain: 
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Figure 4: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Conduits 
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Leases  CBO/CDO  Other 
1995 59.5  153.1  33.1  11.2  3.7  10.6  1.2  43.9 
1996 71.4  180.7  51.6  14.6  10.1  23.7  1.4  50.9 
1997 77  214.5  90.2  19.1  18.3  35.2  19  62.5 
1998 86.9  236.7  124.2  25  25  41.1  47.6  144.7 
1999 114.1  257.9  141.9  33.8  36.4  51.4  84.6  180.7 
2000 133.1  306.3  151.5  36.9  41.1  58.8  124.5  219.6 
2001 187.9  361.9  185.1  42.7  60.2  70.2  167.1  206.1 
2002 221.7  397.9  286.5  44.5  74.4  68.3  234.5  215.4 
2003 234.5  401.9  346  44.3  99.2  70.1  250.9  246.8 
2004 Q1  238.2  406.5  385.1  43.9  102.4  68.7  253.3  250.4 
 
 
Source: Bond Market AssociationTable 2: Sponsor Ratings and Initial Spreads on A Notes: Summary Statistics 
                     
            
   mean      s.d.       
              
Spread    0.48   0.68      
RatingAA   0.25    0.44       
RatingA   0.49    0.50       
RatingB   0.26    0.44       
LowSub    0.25   0.44      
Maturity   5.70    2.25      
SellersInt   6.38    1.21      
FixedRt   0.35    0.48      
I_CCA   0.43    0.50      
I_LOC   0.03    0.17       
I_RES    0.01   0.08      
I_Other    0.02   0.15      
Seasoned    0.43   0.50      
Chargeoff     5.35      1.86      
            
Notes: N=167. The sample is that for A Notes in Table 3 column (5), averaging over 
1988-99.   




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Sponsor Ratings and the Propensity to Securitize: Summary Statistics   
                            
                   
   1991-2000    2000   
   mean      s.d.   mean      s.d.  
                  
I_Sec   0.113  0.317  0.146  0.317   
Sec/Assets   0.033  0.124   0.041  0.124   
RatingAA   0.462  0.499   0.474  0.499   
RatingA   0.446  0.497   0.397  0.497   
RatingB   0.092  0.289  0.129  0.289   
Assets (mil $)    16.0    39.1    25.4  39.1   
CC/Assets   0.050  0.178   0.038  0.178   
CapRatio   0.086  0.036   0.086  0.034   
# obs     5012           363         
               
Notes: In the first panel the sample is that for Table 6 columns (1) and (2), averaging 
over Call Report Data quarters 1991:09 - 2000:06. The second panel averages over only 
2000:03 and 2000:06. See Table 6 and text for variable definitions.   
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o
l
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p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
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h
e
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n
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e
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c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
z
i
n
g
 
(
i
.
e
.
,
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
i
t
 
h
a
s
 
a
n
y
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
z
e
d
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
c
a
r
d
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
 
o
u
t
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
)
.
 
I
n
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
 
(
2
)
,
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
s
e
c
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